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1. Introduction  
 
This paper analyzes the evolution of labour (or employment) policies in Italy, 
focusing on the period between the mid 1990s and the economic crisis that started in 
2008. We will refer to three sets of policies: proactive labour policies, i.e. policies 
directly aimed at promoting employment; passive policies, i.e. policies, aimed at 
supporting workers’ income in case of job loss, reduction or suspension of working 
hours; and policies for the regulation of employment relationships. An aspect related to 
the management of proactive policies concerns the organization of employment 
services, which, due to its peculiar characteristics, will be treated separately. The paper 
focuses on the regular labour market; hence, we will not deal with the policies for the 
regularization of workers and, in general, with the aspect of undeclared or underground 
work. 
The paper is organized as follows. Next section provides a bird’s eye view on 
the main trajectories of development in Italian employment policies until the early 
1990s, in order to establish a baseline for the analysis of labour policy change since 
then, undertaken in the following sections. Section three concentrates on the nature of 
Italian labour policy change: it identifies three key dimensions – strategic, distributive, 
and organizational – through which the specific reforms and changes occurred in this 
period are investigated and interpreted. Section four develops an analytical framework 
to interpret and explain the dynamics of change on the basis of political-institutional 
factors; it also assesses the impact of the various reforms on the pre-existing 
institutional configuration. The conclusions consider the most relevant issues in the 
evolution of employment policies in Italy since the 1990s, and put forward some 
considerations on foreseeable directions of future changes.  
 
  
2. Labour policies in Italy until the early 1990s 
 
The main features of the model adopted to protect workers from the risk of 
unemployment were defined in the period between the end of the Second World War 
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and the mid 1960s. The first public scheme of compulsory insurance against 
unemployment had been introduced in 1919 and it had been reformed during the fascist 
period without undermining its fundamental principles. 
In comparison to most Western European countries, Italy was peculiar in its 
extensive use of discretionary schemes to supplement the salary of workers with 
reduced working hours (in the international terminology, Short Time Work - STW). 
Although STW schemes exists in several European countries – and particularly in those 
with Bismarckian welfare systems  only in Italy have they been used as functional 
equivalents of unemployment insurance schemes [Sacchi, Pancaldi and Arisi 2011]. 
Two main STW schemes exist in Italy - the conjunctural scheme introduced in 1947, 
and  the structural scheme introduced in 19681. In the 1970s and 1980s major 
investments were made in these schemes [Gualmini 1998]. By contrast, the amount and 
the duration of rights-based unemployment benefits were rather modest at the time 
(daily flat-rate, for a maximum duration of 180 days). The reasons for this lie in the 
politics of unemployment compensation, in a balance deriving from the dynamics of 
political exchange between the government, the trade unions, and the entrepreneurs, 
faced with the company crises of the 1970s and 1980s and with increased risk of 
unemployment, from which they tried to protect the core workers of the larger 
industries and of their smaller suppliers. 
Similarly, in the same period, Italy did not introduce, alongside the social 
insurance pillar, any unemployment assistance schemes – typically designed for 
workers who exhaust the right to insurance-based, contributory benefits without having 
found work in the meantime – or any minimum income schemes for the national 
population as a whole, both subject to means testing. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
passive labour policies in Italy were complemented by the introduction of early 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 From now on, the acronym CIG (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) will be used to indicate STW in general. 
When needed, the adjectives “conjunctural” (corresponding to CIG ordinaria) and “structural” 
(corresponding to CIG straordinaria) will be added to provide further specification. 
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retirement schemes, which were extensively used to deal with the labour surplus 
characterizing the entire decade. 
At the end of the 1980s, the unemployment compensation system was innovated. 
For the first time since its institution in 1919, the amount of the benefit (OUB, ordinary 
unemployment benefit) was no longer flat-rate, but it corresponded to a percentage of 
the previous wage, initially equal to 7.5% (the CIG replacement rate amounting to 
80%!). A further innovation concerned the introduction of an unemployment benefit 
with reduced eligibility requirements (RUB). It was designed for those who, although 
meeting the same minimum vesting period requirement of the OUB, were not eligible to 
it due to insufficient contributions paid2. A “reduced” eligibility requirement was 
estabilished, so that although still following an insurance approach, the OUB would 
cater to those workers who had previously enjoyed no protection against unemployment 
due to their discontinuous work careers3. Yet, it was – and still is – not paid out when 
the unemployment period starts, but rather as a lump sum in the following year. Hence, 
several months can elapse between the beginning of the unemployment period and the 
time when the benefit is paid out, thus greatly limiting the ability of this measure to 
support a worker’s income at the time when he or she is out of work. As such, it does 
not fall within the category of income support measures in case of unemployment, but it 
is rather a form of compensation given for the previous year, given with no 
consideration of the current employment condition of the claimant at the time of 
request. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Eligibility to both OUB and RUB is conditional to a minimum vesting period of two years of enrolment 
in the unemployment insurance fund (so-called insurance seniority requirement), which tends to exclude 
from eligibility all new entrants into the labour market. A further contribution requirement is then set for 
OUB, that is having accrued at least 52 weekly contributions in the two years preceding unemployment. 
3 The reduced eligibility requirement is set in terms of worked days: the claimant must have worked for at 
least 78 days in the year before the one s/he applies for it. 
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The Italian governments responded to the economic crisis of the early 1990s by 
adopting a number of new measures. Limiting the duration of the structural CIG, they 
tried to bring it back to its original purpose of social shock absorber in cases of 
temporary personnel surplus. At the same time, there was an attempt at providing social 
protection to those workers who had been excluded from the production process, while 
older workers were encouraged to retire. The purpose of these measures was to reinstate 
the distinction between temporary personnel surplus and permanent surplus of labour, 
requiring workers to move to other companies. To this end, a new protection measure 
was implemented for all the workers excluded from the production process as a 
consequence of collective dismissal procedures or after a period of structural CIG: the 
so-called mobility allowance (available only to workers employed by companies 
eligible for the structural CIG). The issue of leading older workers toward retirement 
was addressed by implementing the so-called “long mobility”. However, the attempt at 
rationalization was soon thwarted. Indeed, given the persistence of a negative economic 
situation, new measures were adopted in the following years which eventually reduced 
the effects of the newly implemented reform, by granting extensions and exceptions to 
the duration of the allowances awarded to specific categories of workers. 
As far as the active policies are concerned, it is worth noting that no initiatives 
were implemented at least until the late 1960s, and the measures introduced in the 1980s 
achieved very poor results in relation to employment growth in the private sector 
[Gualmini 1998]. The job placement system was highly ineffective too, since it was 
based on the public monopoly of job placement services and on a rigid procedural 
system based on the rule of “numerical call”, whereby firms could only specify the 
number of open positions and the occupational category and professional qualification 
pertaining to each vacancy, while the public employment office would fill the vacancies 
with candidates on the basis of their ranking in the employment list, mainly determined 
by the length of their unemployment spell and by their family condition. However, 
Italian companies often ignored this mechanism by resorting to direct transfers of 
workers from one firm to another or, when possible, by recruiting through ”nominative 
call” (i.e directly offering jobs ad personam). The latter, initially allowed only for 
highly skilled personnel and in any case under strict approval of the public employment 
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office, was progressively liberalized during the 1980s, until in the early 1990s it was 
made the standard method of recruitment (via public employment services) in the 
private sector, getting rid of numerical call. 
In the 1980s, the progressive liberalization of the Italian labour market also 
involved new regulations on employment relationships, which marked a partial 
departure from the rigid protective model of employment relationships regulation that 
had characterized the country during the golden age of industrial capitalism and had 
been based on full-time open-ended work contracts4. 
Law 230 of 1962 regulated the right to stipulate fixed-term contracts, rigorously 
listing all the admissible cases. By the end of the 1970s it was permitted to set specific 
terms in case of seasonal business peaks in the trade and tourist sectors, subject to 
authorization by the provincial labour offices In 1983, a law extended this opportunity 
to all economic sectors, but prior authorization by the public administration was still 
mandatory. The “seasonal peaks” innovation was important because the administrative 
authorities now had power over a field which had been previously ruled solely by the 
labour courts, as provided for by the regulations entered into force in 1962. A few years 
later, in 1987, the rigidity of the system devised in 1962 was further reduced by granting 
the possibility of indicating, through collective agreements, additional cases for 
establishing fixed-term contracts as well as alternative cases to those normally 
contemplated by law. This was the most important measure introduced during this phase 
of progressive departure from the rules in force during the golden age, because it 
allowed for substantial deregulation, although still subject to autonomous decisions by 
the trade unions. 
In 1984, a law also introduced the right to stipulate part-time contracts, i.e. 
labour relationships having shorter working hours than normal, spread over a given 
reference period, namely, a day, week, month, or year. Differently from fixed-term 
contacts, part-time contracts were not bound by specific limitations on their use. In the 
same period, trainee contracts and the so-called solidarity contracts were also 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Concerning the characterization of this model, see Vesan [2009]. 
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introduced, the former expanding the set of contracts with a training content, the latter 
as work-sharing devices so as to avoid dismissals or to allow for new hires. 
Hence, during the 1980s the Italian governments partially liberalized labour 
market access rules in order to face up to phenomena such as the growth in 
unemployment, the new needs for flexibilization brought about by technological 
progress and industrial restructuring, the development of the service industry and of the 
industrial districts, as well as increasing female employment. These legislative 
innovations began to undermine the protective nature of the national labour legislation. 
The social partners played a crucial role in this process because, through the adoption of 
exceptions agreed upon during the collective negotiation phase, they allowed for the 
progressive weakening of the principle of standardization of the employment 
relationships. In spite of these changes, at the end of the period analyzed in this section, 
Italy was the OECD country in which it was most difficult for companies to employ 
workers with fixed-term contracts. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
3. What has changed? Labour policies in Italy since the mid 1990s   
 
Starting from the mid 1990s, Italian labour policies have been subject to several 
reforms, which have only partially transformed the overall framework of the previous 
regulations. Our analysis draws a distinction among three key dimensions within this 
process: the strategic dimension, the distributive dimension, and the organizational 
dimension. The strategic dimension concerns changes in the definition of the priority 
objectives pursued by employment policies. The distributive dimension refers to 
changes in the level of protection guaranteed to various categories of workers, as well as 
to the outcomes of the implemented reforms. Lastly, the organizational dimension 
regards transformations in the governance of employment policies and relates to the 
distribution of duties across the various institutional levels of the government as well as 
to the participation of a wide range of actors, both public and private, in the production 
and implementation of employment policies. The following sections describe the major 
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changes that have occurred in Italian labour policies since the mid 1990s by referring to 
the three key dimensions explained above.  
 
3.1 Strategic dimension 
 Major changes in the strategies pursued through Italian labour policies can be 
detected in two areas: the adoption of proactive employment policy measures, and 
reforms promoting flexibility in the regulation of employment relationships. 
Starting from the second half of the 1990s, there has been a gradual reorientation of 
labour policies toward a more proactive attitude, i.e. a stronger focus on measures aimed 
at promoting the occupability of workers and unemployed people . Said reorientation is 
attested by the adoption of conditionality principles in granting unemployment benefits, 
by the gradual abandonment of policies aimed at promoting labour market exit 
(complemented by active aging policies), and, at least partially, by the expenditure trend 
for active policies in comparison to that for passive policies. 
An example of strategic change concerns the adoption of conditionality policies, 
i.e. policies aimed at making the receipt of monetary benefits conditional on the 
unemployed individual complying with certain rules of good behavior. One of the main 
changes brought about by this new policy is the exclusion from unemployment benefits 
in case of resignation by the worker – unless this occurs with just cause, such as, for 
instance, non payment of wages, sexual harassment, mobbing, modifications to one’s 
work duties, and relocation to a place of work far from home. Furthermore, a worker 
can obtain and preserve his/her unemployment status – and consequently be granted 
(ordinary) unemployment benefits – only if certain behavioral requirements are met. 
Since 2000 it is mandatory for the jobseeker to provide a declaration of immediate 
availability to work (dichiarazione di immediata disponibilità - DID), to accept any 
“suitable” job offer and to adhere to a certain set of commitments ranging from simple 
meetings at the job centers (centri per l’impiego - CPIs) to participating in training or 
vocational retraining courses.  
Although these innovations point to a change in strategy toward the recipients of 
monetary benefits, it must be noted that over 60% of the CPIs declare that they find it 
very difficult to implement the new regulations [ISFOL, 2009]. In particular, there are 
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major territorial differences in the actual implementation of the conditionality principle. 
As shown in figure 1, the CPIs located in the South of Italy apply the penalties 
prescribed by the regulations to a lesser extent, whatever the reasons for these territorial 
differences might be.  
 
Figure 1  
 
A second example of proactive reorientation of the national labour policies can 
be found in the gradual abandonment of the strategies aimed at promoting labour market 
exit, complemented by the introduction of active aging policies. For a long time, the 
policies concerning labour market exit had been pursued through early retirement (often 
preceded by the granting of CIG support, renewed several time after the expiry of the 
first period). Since the early 2000s, however, there has been a sharp decrease in the 
number of beneficiaries of early retirement schemes, which does not seem to be offset 
by the much slower increase in the number of those receiving mobility allowance, a 
measure that – especially when of the long mobility type – might acts as a direct 
functional substitute of the above schemes (figure 2). In addition to this, some measures 
have been introduced in the last few years to promote the employability of older 
workers, for example through pilot schemes for the re-employment of individuals over 
45 years of age, or, more generally, through the elimination of the ban on cumulating 
work and pension income. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Lastly, the period between the late 1990s and the early 2000s was marked by a 
rebalancing of the expenditure for passive and active policies, with greater investments 
in active policies. The overall labour policy expenditure has not undergone major 
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changes through time5, despite noticeable variations in the national unemployment rate. 
However the investments in active policies progressively increased starting from the 
mid 1990s, and in 2001-2003 they actually exceeded the total spending for passive 
policies (figure 3). Yet, this trend did not last and in 2004 the expenditure for passive 
policies was greatly incremented, becoming once again higher than that for active 
policies. 
 
Figure 3 
 
Hence, in the last few years, the expenditure trends have partially reverted to the 
levels of the past decades for what concerns the ratio between active and passive 
policies. Employment support measures have once again been relegated to a minor role, 
even though the expenditure gap in relation to passive polices has not been reduced to 
the mid-1990s levels. Two main reasons lie behind this new trend reversals. 
First of all, the increase in passive policies spending is due, other things being 
equal, to the longer duration and higher replacement rate of unemployment benefits (see 
below). Moreover, the expenditure for passive policies has also been affected by the 
growing number of beneficiaries, due to a higher take-up rate, i.e. the rate of actual 
recourse to unemployment benefits, which have become more generous [Anastasia, 
Mancini and Trivellato 2009]. 
Secondly, the sharp decrease in expenditure for active policies might be better 
understood if we look at its composition. If we analyze the changes in the two main 
expenditure items for active labour policies – namely, training and employment 
incentives –, we can see that training policies spending displays an unsteady trend 
between 1995 and 2008, fluctuating between 0.17% and 0.27% of the GDP. On the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Based on the data provided by the OECD, the overall labour policy expenditure in Italy in 2008 
amounted to 1.26% of the GDP, versus 1.22% in 1995. On the contrary, in other European countries, said 
expenditure underwent significant changes between 1995 and 2008. To give some examples, in France it 
went from 2.70% to 1.98%, in Germany from 3.51% to 1.91%, in the United Kingdom from 1.26% to 
0.52%, and in Sweden from 4.62% to 1.45%.  
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contrary, the expenditure for employment incentives rose sharply starting from 1995, 
when it was 0.08% of the GDP, reaching more than 0.4%, but it was drastically reduced 
from 2003 onward and, in the second half of the 2000s, it settled at around 0.15% of the 
GDP. This trend was mainly affected by the expenditure on incentives for the 
recruitment of new workers, which dropped rapidly starting from 2003, after having 
grown considerably between 1996 and 2002. Conversely, the expenditure on incentives 
for the preservation of employment and the stabilization of jobs remained generally 
stable at much lower levels (figure 4). 
 
Figure 4  
 
Lastly, a major example of strategic change in Italian labour policies is 
represented by the important reforms concerning the regulation of employment 
relationships. Law 196 of 1997 (known as Treu law) regulated for the first time the 
contracts for the supply and carrying out of temp agency work, which was already 
widespread in other European countries but had been forbidden in Italy until then by 
law 1369 of 1960. A further step toward the flexibilization of the Italian labour market 
was taken with the adoption of legislative decrees 61 of 2000 and 368 of 2001, which 
implemented the European directives on part-time work and fixed-term work 
respectively. In particular, the new regulations on fixed-term work broke with the past, 
since they introduced the possibility of stipulating fixed-term contracts, without having 
to apply for administrative authorizations or conduct collective negotiations. A key 
turning point in the process of flexibilization of employment relations was law 30 of 
2003 (known as Biagi law), which reviewed and extended the range of labour 
relationships contemplated in the private sector. 
As in many other European countries, in the 1990s and 2000s the reforms 
concerning labour market regulations aimed at increasing the chances of finding work 
and at decreasing the unemployment rate, in particular among the younger generations, 
which in the mid 1990s was above 30% (almost three times the total unemployment 
rate). These reforms were typically introduced “at the margin”, i.e. for the employment 
relationships using new contract types, without undermining the protection enjoyed by 
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those working with open-ended contracts [Davidsson 2011]. In particular, Italy is 
OECD country which has pursued this strategy most thoroughly, by liberalizing fixed-
term contracts more than any other advanced capitalist country, without modifying 
open-ended contracts [Berton, Richiardi and Sacchi 2012]. 
In the period analyzed here, some attempts were made at introducing reforms 
that would affect the employment protection of the core workers, those working with 
open-ended contracts in larger companies, but they failed. In 2002, a proposal by the 
center-right government to reform the regulations about dismissal without just cause 
(article 18 of the Workers’ Statute) was met with very strong opposition by the trade 
unions, above all by the CGIL, and the proposal was withdrawn. The most recent 
attempt at promoting a reform dates back to 2010, when the centre-right government 
tried to introduce new regulations concerning the termination of labour contracts, but 
this attempt was equally unsuccessful. The proposal envisaged the possibility that, when 
establishing a new labour relationship, the employer and the worker might include a 
provision in the labour contract which subtracts the settlement of disputes about 
termination from the ruling of a labour judge, granting instead exclusive decisional 
power on the matter to an arbitration board, which decides on the basis of a fairness 
principle and not necessarily according to the law. This provision would have allowed 
employers to bypass article 18, at least insofar as new labour contracts are concerned, 
but it was withdrawn by the government when the President of the Republic pointed out 
that it might be unconstitutional. 
The strategic reorientation of the policies regulating employment relationships 
seems to be in line with what happened in many advanced countries, particularly in 
western Europe. Keeping in mind that the deregulation of fixed-term labour contracts 
seems not to have produced an increase in the employment rate, but rather to have 
caused open-ended jobs to be replaced with fixed-term positions [Kahn 2010], in Italy 
its effect on the chances offered to young people and to those entering the labour market 
for the first time is still debated. Moreover, the empirical evidence on its ability to be a 
port of entry into the labour market and a springboard to open-ended contracts is 
inconclusive at best [Berton, Richiardi and Sacchi 2012]. One of the main concerns, 
also expressed by the Governor of the Bank of Italy in 2010 [Bank of Italy 2010], is that 
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the diffusion of fixed-term contracts (which, just before the economic crisis started at 
the end of 2008, concerned around 12% of all Italian workers, both employees and self-
employed) might have negative repercussions on labour productivity, above all due to 
the limited investments made by the employers in the training of the individuals 
working with these contracts [Bassanini et al. 2007]. This, indeed, seems to be what has 
happened in Italy [Lotti and Viviano 2008]. 
 
3.2 Distributive dimension 
The second dimension along which Italian labour policies have evolved regards 
changes in the level of protection guaranteed to various categories of workers and the 
effects of said changes on inequalities and workers’ life opportunities. 
The reforms involving the regulation of employment relationships, described in 
the previous section, can also be analyzed along this dimension. On the one hand, we 
can observe a reduction in employment protection of some categories of workers, aimed 
at increasing employment rate. On the other hand, a very relevant aspect pertaining to 
the changes in how employment relationships are regulated has to do with the outcomes 
of the interaction between labour market dynamics and the social protection system, in 
particular the system of income support policies in case of total or partial 
unemployment. These policies will be analyzed in the following pages. 
From the mid 1990s onward, the institutional structure of the so-called “social 
shock absorbers”, that is the income maintenance system in case of no or reduced-hour 
work, has remained unchanged, being still based on insurance schemes and different 
treatments for different categories6. Nevertheless, some major innovations have been 
introduced. Between 1994 and 2008, the nominal replacement rates of ordinary 
unemployment benefits (not in the agricultural sector) more than doubled, rising from 
25% to 60%, whereas their duration went from 6 to 8 months (12 months in the case of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 For a reconstruction of the attempts at reforming the social shock absorbers, see Jessoula and Vesan 
[2011]. 
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workers aged 50 or above)7. Also unemployment benefits with reduced eligibility 
requirements have increased both in their duration (from 156 to 180 days) and for what 
concerns the overall amounts paid (from 30% to 35-40% of the previous income). On 
the contrary, although still retaining high nominal replacement rates (80%, 64% for 
mobility allowance starting from the second year), CIG and mobility allowance have 
been affected by a progressive reduction in their actual amounts, due to the limits 
imposed since 19808. As a consequence, there is less inequality in the treatments offered 
to the two categories of workers, those who can benefit from the more generous CIG 
and mobility schemes and those who have access only to standard unemployment 
benefits9. Nevertheless, the gap between the two categories is still rather wide as regards 
benefit duration: 6 months for OUB, but up to 48 months in case of structural CIG, 
which might then be followed by the granting of mobility allowance. 
The dualism between the categories of workers who can benefit from 
discretionary measures (such as CIG and mobility allowance) and those who receive 
benefits based on their subjective rights (unemployment benefits) has been partially 
reduced. Yet, it is worth noting that the system of social shock absorbers has not been 
adjusted to the changes occurred in the labour market, and this causes major inequalities 
among workers in relation to their actual chances of receiving support in case of 
unemployment. Most non-standard workers suffer the effects of being formally 
excluded from the available protection measures, a problem which deeply affects the 
wage and salary independent contractors in particular. But there is another aspect that 
has an impact on their situation, i.e. the interaction between the rules that regulate the 
granting of benefits, which have remained unchanged for 70 years, and the dynamics of 
the labour market, characterized by fragmented careers and low salaries. This causes a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The replacement rate is reduced to 40% after the first 8 months and to 30% after the first 10 months. 
8 As an example, in 2010 a worker whose gross salary was 1,800! per month and who was involved in a 
CIG procedure at zero working hours would have received a gross amount of 892,96! per month, with 
actual gross replacement rate lower than 50%. 
9 Note that, since 1994, the same limits valid for both the CIG and the mobility allowance have been 
applied to unemployment benefits too. 
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large portion of Italian employees to fail to reach the eligibility requirements needed to 
be granted protection in case of unemployment. By reconstructing the contribution 
histories of Italian workers, Berton, Richiardi and Sacchi [2012] have calculated that 
40% of fixed-term workers and 50% of temp agency workers are not eligible to any 
kind of benefit in case of unemployment, while the figures are even higher for part-time 
workers. Conversely, only around 10% of individuals working with full-time open-
ended contracts are in the same situation. Because of these coverage gaps in the income 
maintenance system during unemployment, if in Italy all the employees lost their job, 
more than 3 million of them (out of around 18 million in total) would not be given any 
kind of support by the social protection system [ibidem]. 
These figures show that the partial reduction in the dualism between the groups 
of workers who receive income support in case of unemployment actually hides a much 
more important dualism – that between the abovementioned categories and all those 
workers who are not covered by the social protection system. It is difficult to 
underestimate how important it would be, in order to reduce said dualism, to introduce 
guaranteed minimum income schemes also in Italy (perhaps alongside a tier of non-
contributory unemployment benefits), considering that these schemes are in place in 
almost all European countries. The introduction of a minimum income scheme was 
attempted in the late 1990s, but the program was soon discontinued [Sacchi and 
Bastagli 2005]. 
This was the situation in Italy when the country was hit by the economic crisis of 
2008. To fill in the gaps existing in the coverage system, rather than reforming the 
regulations for accessing unemployment benefit, the center-right government decided to 
use the discretionary schemes, extending their rules but making sure that no subjective 
rights would be introduced, in order to keep the spending under control. The most 
relevant aspect of this strategy consisted in making ample use of the CIG schemes and 
of the mobility allowance, introducing exceptions to the existing regulations for what 
concerned their duration, the sector and class size of the companies, and the categories 
of workers involved. A further, minor intervention was the introduction of specific 
measures for certain categories of non-standard workers (such as the wage and salary 
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independent contractors in the private sector), characterized by very limited monetary 
amounts and subject to exceedingly strict eligibility conditions10. 
 
3.3 Organizational dimension 
The third dimension of change regards the governance of employment policies 
in Italy. The most relevant example is the reform of the employment services system, 
which modified the previous system based on the public monopoly of job placement. 
With law 196 of 1997, the market of job services was opened to private agencies for the 
supply of labour, while, in the same year, with legislative decree 469 the functions 
pertaining to employment services and active labour policies were devolved to the 
regions and provinces. Networks of job centers (CPIs) were created at the local level to 
replace the previous ministerial employment offices, on the basis of a new mission 
aimed at providing specific assistance services to jobseekers as well as employers. The 
decentralization of functions was fully achieved in 2001 with the reform of Title V of 
the Italian Constitution, which attributes the matter of active labour policies and 
employment services to the competing legislative competence, while law 30 of 2003 
gave more power of intervention to the private operators. 
The conversion of the public monopoly on job services has so far taken place 
along differentiated paths, which have not led to the establishment of a new national 
system of employment services but have rather created a myriad of local systems. 
As far as the institutional setup of the new system is concerned, two relevant 
aspects should be underlined: the low-profile role played by the central administration 
(mainly limited to monitoring activities) and the emergence, at the local level, of several 
organizational models, based on different specific features of the public entities and 
different types of relationships with the private operators [Ministry of Labour 2003; Di 
Domenico 2003]. Moreover, there still seems to be little collaboration between the CPIs 
and the territorial Social Security Administration offices, which are in charge of paying 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See Sacchi, Pancaldi and Arisi [2011] and Berton, Richiardi and Sacchi [2012] for details. 
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out the unemployment benefits. For instance, almost a third of the Italian CPIs state that 
they do not communicate the revocation of an individual’s unemployed status to the 
Social Security Administration offices [ISFOL 2009]. Some experimental initiatives to 
promote coordination have been implemented, but Italy is still far from having a system 
of integrated centers, based on the one-stop shop model available in some other 
European countries (among which, for example, Germany, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and Spain). 
As for the functioning of the system, the CPIs have taken on new functions and 
duties regarding assistance to the unemployed and services to the employers. In this 
case too, however, the general features of the system appear to be non-homogeneous 
and display marked territorial differences. In the North of Italy most of the CPIs (around 
85%) initiate personalized training programs, whereas in the South of Italy this is true 
only in half of the cases [ibidem]. 
Hence, the system is characterized by lower institutional performance in 
implementing the new services exactly in the areas of Italy where employment problems 
are more widespread and deeply felt. The more limited ability of the CPIs located in the 
South of the country to provide the services required of them does not seem to be 
ascribable to their being short staffed, a problem which, conversely, seems to affect 
many CPIs in the North [ibidem]. Instead, the delays in implementing the services in 
several parts of the South seem to be linked to lacking infrastructures, to the 
permanence of obsolete administrative practices, and to the fact that the new duties of 
the CPIs are essentially designed for dynamic economic and labour market contexts 
[Pirrone and Sestito 2006]. 
 
 
4. Interpreting labour policy change: dynamics and impacts 
 
In the last twenty years, employment policies in Italy have undergone major 
changes, which we have analyzed along three dimensions related to their nature: policy 
objectives (strategic change), levels and outcomes of the protection granted to different 
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categories of workers (distributive change), and organizational governance and setup of 
the policy system (organizational change). 
In this section, we try a first stab at providing an explanation of the dynamics, 
rather than the nature, of such changes, namely whether change in a given policy 
subfield has taken place through a continuous process of adaptation of the existing 
policies to new challenges, or through discontinuity and measures that break with the 
past, leading to the introduction of new policy solutions. According to the definitions 
proposed by Capano [2009], the first type of change is called evolutionary, whereas the 
second is revolutionary11. To provide examples of this difference, which will be further 
explained below, increasing the amount of unemployment benefits is an evolutionary 
change, whereas the introduction of the principle of conditionality (meaning that the 
benefit is conditional on the worker’s willingness to be trained or accept job offers) falls 
within the category of revolutionary change. 
We argue that in order to explain the dynamics of change we must look at the 
sequential interaction between the characteristics of the political context and the 
characteristics of the institution undergoing modifications12. The first property regards 
the opportunities of vetoing new regulations, provided by the political context to the 
actors that oppose the change; the second property is related to the structural 
opportunities provided by the institution undergoing change to the same actors in order 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 ‘The dynamics of policy development may be intrinsically evolutionary or revolutionary. By 
“evolutionary” we mean that they involve a process of continuous adaptation. This process of adaptation, 
which is of an incremental, gradual nature, may be slow but may also at times be rapid […]. 
[E]volutionary changes can be so fast that they may seem to be revolutionary, but in reality they represent 
a certain continuity with the past rather than any true novelty. Policy developments may also be 
revolutionary, that is, characterized by radical, discontinuous, unpredictable breaks from the past […]. In 
such cases, changes really are innovative departures from previous directions, and as such constitute 
original new solutions to policy problems’ [Capano 2009, 12]. 
12 In the following paragraphs, we reinterpret the ideas expressed by Hacker [2004] and Mahoney and 
Thelen [2009], adapting them to our purposes. It should be emphasized that this contribution does not 
directly investigate and seek to explain the reasons why change occurs, i.e. its causes, but rather its 
dynamics, i.e. how a change that has been initiated actually occurs. 
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to pursue strategies aimed at making up, in implementation, for the defeats suffered in 
the policy decision stage. In other words, the first property regards the barriers to 
change imposed by the political context, whereas the second concerns the opportunities 
to neutralize or reduce the scope of certain decisions by exercising discretion in their 
interpretation and implementation. 
Among the two, the dominant explanatory factor of the dynamics of change in 
Italian labour policies lies in the veto opportunities supplied by the political context. 
This means that, as a general rule, when the veto opportunities provided to the actors 
that oppose the change are limited, we can expect the change to be of the revolutionary 
type, whereas, when the opportunities are higher, we can expect the change to be of the 
evolutionary type. Nevertheless, the actual dynamics of change also depends on the 
opportunities given – or denied – to those who oppose the change to take advantage of 
the characteristics of the institution being reformed. Indeed, if there are good chances of 
opposing the change (that is, high veto opportunities), this will usually follow an 
evolutionary dynamics unless the room for discretion in implementing the rules is so 
considerable that the actors who promote the reforms are allowed to introduce 
revolutionary changes with the relative acquiescence of those opposing them. The 
opponents might in fact deem it more profitable to keep the level of conflict low and 
intervene at a later stage, i.e. the implementation phase, in order to eliminate the least 
desirable aspects of the reform, rather than be forced to confront its promoters within 
the much more visible context of decision making. Similarly, if the veto opportunities 
are low, the change will usually be of the revolutionary type, unless when the room for 
discretion in implementing the rules is so limited that the actors who oppose the reforms 
are compelled to be extremely bold, since they know that it will be difficult to reduce 
the impact of the decisions during the implementation phase. In the latter case, the 
actors who promote a reform might try to reach a compromise with the opponents, thus 
leading to a change of the evolutionary type. Figure 5 illustrate the four possible causal 
sequences. 
 
Figure 5 
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The different dynamics of change, illustrated in section 3 of this paper according 
to their nature, can thus be interpreted in light of the analytical framework explained 
above. 
The strategic change which involves the regulation of labour relationships 
displays a dynamic of the evolutionary type, whose explanation might be applied also to 
trends in active policies. As shown by the failed attempts at modifying, both directly 
and indirectly, the employment protection regime for individuals working in companies 
with more than 15 employees (in brief, article 18 of the Workers’ Statute), it has so far 
been impossible to introduce a radical liberalization of the regulation of employment 
relationships to provide the unemployed with better employment chances13. Such a 
change, that would clearly fit the bill for the revolutionary type, has been prevented so 
far due to very strong vetoes originating in the political context. Those who oppose such 
a reform are fully aware of the fact that it would be quite difficult to neutralize or 
significantly reduce its effects in the implementation stage14. Faced with the problem 
pressure caused in the mid 1990s by very high rates of youth unemployment, the public 
decision-makers thus reacted by introducing two parallel instruments: labour market 
reforms at the margin (the abovementioned Treu law of 1997 and Biagi law of 2003), 
and incentives to the recruitment of new workers, both of which are evolutionary 
changes that make it easier to overcome the existing vetoes. 
The 1997 reform was launched on the basis of a 1993 Agreement among the 
government, the trade unions, and the employers associations and of the 1996 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The economic literature, both theoretical and empirical, shows that the employment protection 
legislation affects the composition of unemployment, by protecting those who already have a work 
contract from competition by those who are seeking new employment [Lindbeck and Snower 2002, 
OECD 2004]. 
14 It is worth noting that we are not implying that there is no discretionality in implementing labour 
relationships regulations, for example by labour judges, and moreover the procedures required by law are 
often in practice disregarded by the economic operators. We are simply stating that once a deregulation of 
open-ended employment relationships is in place, its degree of compulsoriness is very high and its effects 
cannot be overturned through interpretation. 
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Employment Pact (Patto per il Lavoro), whereas the 2003 reform stemmed from the 
2002 Pact for Italy (Patto per l’Italia), signed by the government and the social partners 
(but not by the CGIL). Labour policy instruments utterly innovative within the Italian 
context of the time were introduced (temp agency work in 1997, and several new 
contracts in 2003), but still within a dynamics of change of the evolutionary type:, that 
is, reforms at the margin. 
The evolution of active labour policies can be interpreted in relation to what has 
just been described. As explained in section 3, the growing expenditure for active labour 
policies in the 1997-2003 period can be entirely ascribed to incentives for the 
recruitment of new workers. In our interpretation, these incentives fall within an 
evolutionary response to the challenge of youth unemployment, since a revolutionary 
approach proved impossible for the abovementioned reasons. Hence, initially, this 
distributive instrument was regarded as a functional equivalent of the regulatory 
instrument (liberalization at the margin of the labour market) and the two instruments 
were used together as measures to trim down labour costs. In 2003, once reforms at the 
margin of the employment relationships had been largely achieved, the functional need 
for the distributive instrument – which had in the meantime become very costly – was 
reduced and it was eventually abandoned, with the said effects on the spending for 
active policies from then on. The causal sequence guiding the labour market reforms 
and the evolution of active policies is indicated by the Roman numeral I in Figure 5. 
The changes that have occurred in the last twenty years for what concerns the 
social shock absorbers can also be interpreted as evolutionary. They have not 
undermined the general framework of the system, but they have simply adapted the 
previous regulations by modifying the replacement rates or the duration of the benefits, 
or else by extending, often through temporary exception procedures, access to mobility 
allowance or  short time work schemes to previously excluded groups of workers 
(although in the Conclusions we argue that it is difficult, at present, to predict the 
outcomes of emergency procedures concerning the social shock absorbers). The 
impossibility of bringing about a revolutionary change is due to the opposition on the 
part of the governments and the social partners toward the adoption of a fairer social 
protection system, capable of dealing with the new risks of the post-industrial labour 
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market. This is because, besides implying higher costs, a revolutionary change would 
lead to the granting of subjective rights, rather than be limited to discretionary 
provisions. Moreover, such a change would reduce, on the one hand, the power of 
intermediation of some social actors, notably the trade unions, and, on the other hand, 
the possibility of using discretionary measures to face problems linked to the risk of 
unemployment, while also keeping the spending under control. Hence, the causal 
sequence of the reforms falls once again under I in figure 5. 
As far as the reforms of employment services are concerned, instead, the 
dynamics of labour policy change has been characterized by clear discontinuity with the 
past, and it has taken on revolutionary features. In this case, the veto opportunities had 
been reduced by a series of facilitating factors occurring in the years preceding the 
overhaul of the system, occurred between 1997 and 2003. The progressive abandonment 
of the hiring by the “numerical call” system had made the prospect of an overall reform 
more acceptable to the trade unions and the job placement workers, numerically 
speaking the largest component of the staff within the Ministry of Labour [Musso 
2004]. Furthermore, the opportunity of redefining the duties concerning the planning 
and management of active labour policies and employment services, by transferring 
most of the costs to the regional administrations and by using the resources of the 
European Social Fund, provided a viable solution to the inadequacy of the old 
employment service system. Also, in that period, the public monopoly of the 
employment services was the subject of a pending lawsuit at the European Court of 
Justice, which would soon declare the ban on private intermediation illegitimate (a ban 
which had been sanctioned by law in Italy since 1949). Besides these characteristics of 
the political context, another element, which will clearly emerge from our discussion on 
the impact of the reforms, must be considered: right from the start, the implementation 
of the reform seemed to allow for ample discretion, since it dealt with organizing and 
providing services that had just been introduced. Therefore, the reform of the 
employment services falls into causal sequence IV in figure 5. 
Both active aging and conditionality policies also display dynamics that indicate 
revolutionary change. 
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Despite being low-discretionary regulations, the changes introduced by active 
aging policies are characterized by a revolutionary dynamics, vis-à-vis the labour 
market exit strategies pursued during the 1980s. This is because their process of change 
has not been met with strong vetoes, also thanks to the presence of a functional 
replacement, i.e. the so-called long mobility (which, however, does not offset the 
decrease in early retirements). The most appropriate sequence to describe this type of 
change is IIIa in figure 5.  
In the implementation of active aging policies, the role played by discretion has 
not been sufficient to subvert the dynamics activated by the veto opportunities (which 
were limited, in this case). Conversely, it is very interesting to analyze the change 
leading to the introduction and diffusion of conditionality policies in Italy. Ample 
discretion in both the interpretation and the implementation of the reform has made it 
possible to follow a revolutionary dynamics, despite the unfavourable conditions 
created by the political context. In this case, the relevant sequence in figure 5 is IIb. 
Strict and systematic checks on a worker’s unemployment status and active job search 
would be met with strong opposition, since benefits and advantages related to being 
unemployed might easily be revoked. However, the “repressive” features linked to the 
application of sanctions against the recipients who do not meet obligations set by the 
jobcenters has been watered down by the lax interpretation of the conditionality 
regulations [Pirrone and Sestito 2006]. This has made it possible to overcome the 
existing vetoes and to attain a revolutionary dynamics.  
After having investigated the dynamics of the processes of change affecting 
Italian labour policies from the mid 1990s onwards, it might be interesting to provide an 
assessment of their impact on the pre-existing institutional configuration. In some cases, 
the changes have had a major impact, radically and permanently modifying the policy in 
question; in some other situations, there has been a rather minor impact, with limited 
consequences in terms of policy design and functioning. Table 1 displays, for mere 
illustrative purposes, what will be said below about the institutional impact of the 
various changes occurred in Italian labour policies.  
 
Table 5 
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Despite their evolutionary nature, the reforms at the margins of the labour 
market have certainly had a profound impact. Since the early 1990s, Italy has gone from 
being the advanced capitalist country with the strictest rules on fixed-term contracts to 
having medium-low regulation. At the same time, it has witnessed the strongest 
reduction in the rate of employment protection for fixed-term workers. The share of 
employees with fixed-term contracts has almost tripled in less than twenty years, 
reaching figures in line with the European average. In 1990 fixed-term workers were 
5.2%, equal to half the percentage in Europe (EU-15 average), France, or Germany 
(10.5% in all three cases). But, by 2008, they had grown to 13.3%, compared to an 
increase, in the same period, to 14.2% in France, 14.7% in Germany, and 14.4% in the 
EU (EU-15 average). The share of fixed-term workers in the 15-24 age bracket 
increased fourfold, going from 11.2% in 1990 to 43.3% in 2008 (from 27.6% to 41.4% 
in EU-15, from 38% to 51.5% in France, and from 34.1% to 56.6% in Germany)15. 
While the Italian labour market has undergone significant changes, the system of 
social shock absorbers was subject to very limited modifications, at least until the 
economic crisis started in 2008. The only effect was a reduction in the dualism existing 
within the category of employees benefiting from income maintenance schemes, in the 
form of either short-time work schemes or unemployment benefits. The fact remains 
that, in case of unemployment, around 20% of employees and independent contractors 
are excluded from any form of protection by the Italian welfare system. An 
interpretation of the instruments adopted from 2009 onward to respond to the economic 
crisis, the so-called “emergency” social shock absorbers, appears to be more complex 
and it will be dealt with in the Conclusions. 
The changes that have occurred in active labour policies almost entirely concern 
an increase in expenditure to promote the recruitment of new workers in the 1997-2003 
period and the elimination of said item of expenditure in the following years. Therefore, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics. 
! 25!
the institutional impact of these changes has been fairly limited, due to their transitory 
nature. 
As far as employment services are concerned, the changes implemented have 
had a non-homogeneous impact, with great territorial differences, especially between 
the North and the South of the country. Indeed, more so than other aspects of the labour 
policies investigated here, the changes in the organization of the employment services 
have been subject to implementation deficits. These deficits are ascribable to different 
socio-economic conditions and to insufficient human capital and technological 
resources. The above remarks on the impact of the employment services reform can be 
extended to the actual application of the conditionality principle, which is also highly 
differentiated across the national territory. Wide discretionary margins in the actual 
management of employment services have strongly contributed to the fact that the new 
regulations have not been applied coherently and systematically all over the country. 
Lastly, the central government has generally failed to comply with its duties concerning 
the coordination, monitoring, and assessment of the implemented measures [Pirrone 
2008]. 
Finally, active aging policies have had a major impact, at least from the institutional 
point of view. Early retirement schemes, which for several years played a crucial role in 
the management of company crises, have been abolished, but the so-called long 
mobility does not seem to have replaced them in full. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that until now the instruments aimed at prolonging an individual’s 
working life have not been used extensively. Hence, their impact has been relevant in 
eliminating the existing obstacles to active aging but it has not (yet) contributed to its 
promotion. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has illustrated the key changes that have occurred in Italian labour 
policies over the last twenty years. The most relevant institutional impact was produced 
by the reforms affecting the margins of the Italian employment relationships, which 
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made the Italian labour market more flexible. While the empirical evidence regarding 
the impact of the reforms on the creation of greater employment opportunities is not 
univocal, it is undeniable that these innovations were not complemented by other 
reforms aimed at increasing employability and security of non-standard workers. 
On the issue of employability, in comparison to being unemployed, being 
employed with fixed-term contracts actually offers greater chances of finding open-
ended jobs, but only when the transition occurs within the same firm [Berton, Devicienti 
and Pacelli 2012]. In other words, when fixed-term workers seek employment outside 
their company, they do not have greater chances than the unemployed of finding an 
open-ended job, presumably because they have not acquired skills that can be spent 
elsewhere. In any case, the most likely outcome for these workers is that of entering into 
a new fixed-term labour contract [ibidem]. 
Within this context, a crucial role is played by the training opportunities offered 
to workers, with rising concerns about the medium-term consequences on the Italian 
economic system of reduced investments in human capital, which affect a wider and 
wider portion of workers. On the same matter of workers’ employability, moreover, we 
have more than once underlined that the implementation of the employment services 
reform was not homogeneous across Italy and, in particular in the south, its impact was 
very limited. 
On the issue of social security, despite the massive changes in the regulation of 
employment relationships pertaining to non-standard workers, the system of social 
shock absorbers did not undergo a corresponding structural change. Within a protection 
system based on social insurance, the interaction between the profound changes 
occurred in the labour market and the stratification of regulations focusing on full-time 
open-ended contracts, has brought about major disadvantages for certain categories of 
non-standard workers, affected by lower employment continuity – hence, lower labour 
income – as well as lower social protection, or even no protection at all: a situation that 
may well be dubbed one of pervasive “flex-insecurity”. 
These are the main structural issues of Italian labour policies before the 
economic crisis of 2008. If not addressed through public policies, they will inevitably 
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produce dysfunctional consequences on the whole policy sector, above all on the 
wellbeing and security of Italian workers. 
In responding to the crisis, the main focus has been on plugging the largest gaps 
in the existing labour policy system, though without addressing its main structural 
issues. The interventions have been aimed at managing the emergency, while avoiding 
the creation of new subjective rights and keeping the adopted instruments under the 
public authorities’ discretionary control, in order to limit spending.  
This is why it is difficult to place the main instrument adopted to respond to the 
economic and employment crisis, i.e. the emergency social shock absorbers, into one of 
the categories presented in figure 5. On the one hand, they are rather traditional, insofar 
as they innovate only some marginal aspects of the existing regulations (by providing 
for exceptions to the latter). On the other hand, they bear the seed of momentous 
change, because they can be applied in principle to all categories of employees, 
regardless of their sector and type of contract. Yet, the way in which they were 
introduced – through emergency and discretionary actions and without granting the 
certainty of support when needed – makes it extremely hard to predict the degree of 
change they will produce. 
The economic downturn has also brought to light the important contribution 
given by intermediate bodies – such as bipartite agencies bringing together trade unions 
and employers associations from a given professional category – in shaping recent 
developments in Italian labour policies. This is particularly relevant for what concerns 
(supplementary) income maintenance provisions and training schemes offered to 
workers, precisely the two aspects which we have indicated as the most critical in the 
future. The setting up of these agencies can also bear the seed of momentous change for 
the national labour policies, but it lacks the grounds provided by a fair and 
comprehensive social protection system. The prerequisite for negotiation agreements 
should be a universalistic floor of social and training rights available to all workers, in 
particular during job-to-job transitions, aimed at ensuring social protection and at 
increasing their employability. If such a universalistic floor does not exist, the direction 
recently taken by labour policies in Italy runs the risk of bringing about new and long-
lasting dualisms and inequalities in the years to come. 
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Table 1 Dynamics and impact of changes in Italian employment policies, ca. 1995-2010 
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Figure 1. Implementation of conditionality – % values 
 
Source: Isfol [2009] 
Notes: the data are based on what stated by staff members of the public employment offices (CPIs); 
DID means declaration of immediate availability to work 
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Figure 2. Beneficiaries of mobility allowance and early retirement, 2000-2008 
 
Source: own elaboration on data from the Ministry of Labour’s monitoring reports, various years 
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Figure 3. Employment policies expenditure trend (as % of GDP, left axis) and 
unemployment rate (right axis) 
 
 
Note: data on expenditure for public employment services are available in Italy only since 2004 
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics 
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Figure 4 Active policies composition and incidence of various incentives  
 
 
Note: expenditure on training and incentives (1995-2008) as percentage of the GDP (left axis); 
expenditure on recruitment incentives and incentives for the stabilization of jobs and preservation of 
employment (1996-2006) in millions of Euros (right axis). 
 
Source: for training and incentives, OECD, Labour Force Statistics; for recruitment, stabilization, and 
preservation, Ministry of Labour, Monitoring Reports, various years 
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Figure 5 Causal sequences in the dynamics of change of Italian employment policies 
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